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Introduction
Medicaid is a U.S. government program to pay for health-care services for some low-income families and individuals. It is funded jointly by the federal and state governments. Growing concern over the rapid increase in Medicaid's spending for outpatient prescription drugs led to the enactment of the Medicaid rebate program in 1990. This rebate program, established by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, requires drug manufacturers to o¤er rebates to Medicaid based on the discounts o¤ered to other large purchasers. This is a form of "most favored customer" (MFC) clause. In particular, Medicaid collects a …xed rebate on each unit of purchase by Medicaid customers. The unit rebate is calculated as the di¤erence between the minimum price and the quantity-weighted average price (minimum price provisioning or MPP), or a fraction of the quantity-weighted average prescription drugs. Although this program seems to have succeeded in lowering Medicaid's in ‡ation-adjusted drug expenditures (Congressional Budget O¢ ce [4] ), its overall e¤ects are not obvious. Pharmaceutical manufacturers should react to the rebate rule, thus potentially changing their price distribution across markets. What is the nature of this optimal price response? The savings to Medicaid, if any, would not generally be the same as those calculated without taking into account the change in optimal pricing strategy. Non-Medicaid purchasers are also a¤ected by the rebate rule. For example, Duggan and Scott Morton [10] estimate that for the top 200 drug treatments, the average price of a non-Medicaid prescription would have been 13.3 percent lower in 2002 if the Medicaid MFC clause had not been in e¤ect. The rebate rule also a¤ects drug manufacturers'pro…t adversely. It is important to examine the aggregate welfare e¤ects of this cost-saving mechanism. Given the changes that take place as a consequence of the rebate rule, what happens to social welfare?
We analyze a model where a monopolist optimally determines her pricing strategy, subject to MPP or APP clauses. We examine these two types of MFC clauses separately. Medicaid consumers do not pay for their drugs directly (though in some states they do have small co-payments (Hearne [11] )). Thus, their price sensitivity may be less compared to non-Medicaid purchasers'price sensitivity. On the other hand, Medicaid customers' purchases are in ‡uenced by physicians and others (including those running state drug formularies) as well as possible co-payments and thus it may not necessarily be completely inelastic 5 . We therefore assume that Medicaid participant's demand is a weighted combination of two components: (i) an elastic component, which is the same as non-Medicaid consumers' demand, and (ii) an inelastic component. The weight of the inelastic component is a parameter in our framework. In examining the impact of the rebate rule on social welfare, we use Marshallian welfare, the sum of consumers'and producers'surplus, as our measure of social welfare. What do we …nd? A quick preview of some of our results follows. Our analysis of MPP is done with two markets. Under MPP, the minimum price charged always rises compared to the no regulation case. In contrast, the maximum price will (weakly) fall. The maximum price will remain unchanged if Medicaid demand is as elastic as non-Medicaid demand. The welfare e¤ect of MPP may be good or bad. A useful su¢ cient condition for MPP to be welfare improving is that MPP raise aggregate quantity.
Under APP, prices in all markets move in the same direction if either Medicaid demand is suf…ciently inelastic or Medicaid participant's demand is almost as elastic as non-medicaid consumers' demand. When Medicaid participant's demand is almost as elastic as non-medicaid consumers' demand, prices increase. In contrast, when Medicaid participants'demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, prices in all markets fall. As with MPP, the welfare e¤ect of imposing APP is ambiguous in general. When prices in all markets fall, both welfare and aggregate quantity increase, while if all prices increase this is welfare and quantity decreasing.
Though the motivation for this paper mainly comes from the MFC clauses that are featured in the Medicaid reimbursement policy, a broad class of contractual problems features similar MFC clauses, especially in the form of MPP. Such clauses are used in contractual agreements in di¤erent industries (e.g. external referencing policy in drug pricing in the context of Europe (see Heuer, Mejer and Neuhaus [12] , Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac and Olivella [16] ), agreements between health care providers and health practitioners (see Martin [17] ), and most favored nation clauses in legal settlements (see Spier [31] , [32] ). 6 Modeling applications of MPP in a more general context requires a modi…ed formulation of MPP compared to the one used in the context of Medicaid. This is because of the following. Though Medicaid collects a rebate from the sale price on each unit of purchase by a Medicaid-covered consumer, the amount of rebate is not known at the time of purchase. The rebate is calculated only later, once the total Medicaid purchases, as well as the relevant minimum and quantityweighted average prices are known. Furthermore, the rebate is paid by the manufacturer directly to Medicaid, and is essentially invisible to consumers. Therefore, the e¤ective demand by Medicaid customer is likely to be based on the pre-rebate market prices. In other applications of MPP, MFCs are often aware of the minimum price at the time of purchase or more directly involved in the rebate process. To facilitate this wider application of MPP, we also analyze a rebate-responsive version of MPP in which MFCs demand is directly a¤ected by the price net of rebate (i.e., the minimum price).
We …nd that our results on the e¤ect of MPP on pricing and welfare in the context of Medicaid also hold true qualitatively with this alternative version of MPP. Understanding the e¤ects of these regulations is not simply of interest for evaluation of Medicaid policy, but is also important as a guide to future regulation. For example, recently there has been debate about the appropriate regulatory regime to govern drug purchases and reimbursement under Medicare, the US government program of health insurance for the elderly (Jacobson, Panangala and Hearne [13] ).
Related Literature
The literature related to the Medicaid rebate program and its rebate rules has been primarily empirical. The only theoretical models of monopoly behavior under these rules that we know of are in the brief theory sections of Scott Morton [29] and Congressional Budget O¢ ce [4] . The seminal Scott Morton [29] is closely related to and an important motivation for our analysis. We borrow the third degree price discrimination structure and the possibility that Medicaid consumers'demand may be less elastic than other consumers'demand from her model, but there are a number of key di¤erences in our formulation and treatment of the problem. First, we do not limit our analysis to the case of linear market demand curves -we allow general downward sloping, continuously di¤erentiable demands. Nor do we limit ourselves to polar cases in terms of elasticity for Medicaid consumers'demand -we have a continuous parameter indexing elasticity. Second, we analyze how these MFC clauses could a¤ect social welfare, an aspect not studied in Scott Morton ( [29] , [30] ) or Congressional Budget O¢ ce [4] . Third, we …nd conditions under which non-MFC prices in all markets increase when an APP rule is imposed and also conditions under which these prices decrease in all markets as a result of APP. Finally, in our formulation of MPP and APP, we assume that the e¤ective demand of Medicaid consumers is based on the pre-rebate prices, motivated by the fact that the amount of the rebate is neither determined at the time of purchase nor does the ultimate rebate involve any party except the manufacturer and Medicaid. In contrast, Scott Morton assumes that the demand of Medicaid consumers is a function of the post-rebate price. This is most related to our alternative MPP formulation, in which we also assume MFC demand depends on post-rebate prices. In comparing this formulation to Scott Morton, in addition to the …rst two di¤erences pointed out above, we note that we provide a full characterization 6 For further discussion, see Section 6.1.2.
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of the solution, and, even in the special case of linear demand, this solution only coincides with that in Scott Morton [29] under additional and restrictive assumptions.
The welfare aspect of our work has close connections with the literature on the welfare e¤ects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist. The e¤ect of price discrimination on social welfare was …rst studied by Robinson [25] . Schmalensee [27] reexamined the problem, and provided a su¢ cient condition for welfare to decrease under uniform pricing as compared to third degree price discrimination. He shows that uniform pricing can lead to a decrease in welfare only if it leads to an decrease in aggregate demand. As stated above, we show a similar result for MPP -imposition of MPP can lead to a decrease in welfare only if it leads to a decrease in aggregate demand. Varian [36] extends Schmalensee's results and proves additional results in a setting where demand in any market can depend on prices in other markets and marginal cost is constant or increasing. 7 Varian's [36] techniques prove useful in our welfare analysis of MPP. Concerning the welfare e¤ects of APP, the closest work is Armstrong and Vickers [1, case 2] which analyzes the welfare e¤ect of a price regulation somewhat related to APP. They use a convexity property of the consumer surplus function to establish that consumer surplus decreases when moving from a given uniform price across all markets to price discrimination with a constraint that quantity weighted average price is at most the given uniform price. Moreover, when the negative e¤ect of price discrimination on consumer surplus is su¢ ciently small, they show the increase in producer's surplus dominates the loss in consumers' surplus, and therefore, aggregate welfare increases if the producer is allowed to price discriminate to a small extent. Unfortunately, the bene…ts of this convexity property of the consumer surplus function are largely limited to circumstances where one of the benchmark pricing schemes is uniform. As neither unconstrained prices nor prices under APP are generally uniform, we are not able to bene…t from Armstrong and Vickers [1, case 2]'s techniques. The empirical work on the Medicaid rebate program includes two United States General Accounting O¢ ce (GAO) studies ( [34] , [35] ), a Congressional Budget O¢ ce report [4] , Scott Morton ( [29] , [30] ) and Duggan and Scott Morton [10] . All of these papers …nd some evidence of post-rebate rule increases in drug prices for non-Medicaid buyers. GAO [34] studied how Veterans A¤airs (VA) and Department of Defense (DoD) prescription drug prices had changed, while GAO [35] examined drug prices to health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and hospitals. In both cases price increases were observed, but the GAO could not determine whether the price growth was attributable to the rebate rules. The Congressional Budget O¢ ce [4] report concluded that although the rebate rule lowered Medicaid expenditure, it increased the prices paid by some purchasers in the private sector. Scott Morton [29] …nds that the price of branded products facing generic competition rose. For generic drugs, the increase in price is higher as markets become more concentrated. Scott Morton [30] …nds that products with higher ex-ante price dispersion show a greater increase in price when the rebate rule is in e¤ect, consistent with the theory. Duggan and Scott Morton [10] , as mentioned above, estimate that the average price of a non-Medicaid prescription would have been 13.3 percent lower in 2002 if the Medicaid MFC clause had not been in e¤ect. They also …nd an increase in new drug introductions for the purpose of raising prices in reaction to a provision in the OBRA 90 legislation that ties increases in existing drug prices to in ‡ation.
Rules like MPP have been studied in a number of other contexts. [19] , [20] , [21] , Png [23] , Png and Hershleifer [24] , and Salop [26] . Spier [31] studies uses of MFC-type clauses in settlement of litigation. The use of MPP with long term contracts has been studied by Butz [3] in the context of durable goods monopoly. Butz analyzes how MPP can be used to facilitate commitment not to reduce price in the future, and thereby sustain the monopoly price for the product. In his analysis, MPP is used as a strategic device by the monopolist in its intertemporal game with consumers to change consumer demand by changing beliefs about future prices. Thus even in the monopoly context, the emphasis has been on strategic e¤ects. Our analysis di¤ers substantially from those mentioned in this paragraph because our focus is on the unilateral/own-price e¤ects of such clauses rather than the strategic e¤ects operating through competitor or consumer reaction. In particular, none of our pricing or welfare results may be derived from this literature. Our analysis of the alternative, rebate-responsive MPP is related to the literature on the theory of pricing with external referencing (ER) and with parallel imports (PI). Applications of ER and PI are common in the context of drug pricing in Europe and in North America (see Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac and Olivella [16] , Pecorino [22] and Jelovac and Bordoy [15] ). In ER, a product's price in one market (call it the target price) is required to be below a function of the price of the same product in another market (call it the reference price). An example would be one country requiring that a drug be no more expensive than in a neighboring country. PI refers to allowing the importation of a product that may also be produced domestically. Like ER, PI leads to a link between the target price and the reference price, but with PI this link is indirect. If the home country imports, then the home price is e¤ectively bounded by the foreign price plus the cost of importing. Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac and Olivella [16] studies the pricing problem with ER in the context of drug pricing regulation in Europe. Pecorino [22] and Jelovac and Bordoy [15] study a similar pricing problem with PI in the context of drug importation. Among their …ndings is that the reference price may increase in the presence of ER or PI. In the context of rebate-responsive MPP, considering the minimum price as the reference price and the MFC price as the target price, we show a similar result. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the general model and specify the monopolist's objective function under the two rules. In section 4, we solve the optimization problem under MPP and examine its welfare implications. Section 5 carries out a similar investigation for the APP rule. In Section 6.1, we present the analysis of the rebate-responsive form of MPP and include a discussion of some non-Medicaid applications. Section 7 concludes. Proofs not included in the main text are collected in an Appendix.
The Model
Consider a monopolist selling a single good in n di¤erent markets, indexed by i. We assume that the monopolist cannot discriminate between consumers within a market, but it can prevent arbitrage by consumers across markets. The presence of a MFC provision divides consumers in each market into two categories: MFCs and non-MFCs. If all consumers in market i were non-MFCs, the demand function in market i would be given by a downward sloping, non-negative, continuously di¤erentiable demand curve, q i (p i ), for the product, where p i is the price charged in market i. In the context of Medicaid, MFCs'price sensitivity may be di¤erent from non-MFCs'price sensitivity, as Medicaid consumers do not pay for their drugs directly. Their purchases, however, are in ‡uenced by physicians and others (including those running state drug formularies) as well as possible co-payments. To incorporate various possibilities, we describe MFC demand as follows: If all consumer in market i were MFCs, the demand function in market i would be given by (1 ) q i (p i ) + z i , for constants z i > 0 and 2 [0; 1], where p i is the price charged in market i. The constant measures how inelastic MFC demand is, compared to non-MFC demand. For simplicity, we assume that the fraction of MFCs in each market is the same and we denote this fraction by 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, total demand in market i is given by
Again for simplicity, we consider a linear cost function C(q) = cq. We also assume there are gains from trade in all markets, i.e., q i (c) > 0. Without any MFC provision, the monopolist's total pro…t can be written as
Within this model of third-degree price discrimination, we analyze the consequences of MFC clauses. In particular, the MFC clauses related to Medicaid each involve a rebate, which we denote by r, on each unit purchased for a Medicaid-covered consumer. For practical reasons, the rebate amount is calculated only retrospectively, once the Medicaid purchases are known, and is paid directly from the manufacturer to Medicaid. 8 Thus, the rebate amount is essentially invisible to consumers at the time of purchase. We will assume, therefore, that demand from MFCs is una¤ected by the rebate amount. 9 To avoid confusion between prices gross and net of rebate, we refer to the (gross of rebate)
prices, p i , as market prices while the (net of rebate) prices that Medicaid pays for each unit purchased by MFCs in market i, p i r, are referred to as post-rebate prices. With an MFC clause in e¤ect, the monopolist will take the rebate into account and chooses market prices to maximize
There are two di¤erent rules that Medicaid uses to calculate the per unit rebate: (i) Minimum price provision (MPP), and (ii) Average price provision (APP). We study them separately.
Under MPP, Medicaid claims the di¤erence between p q , the quantity weighted average market price, and p min min (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ), the minimum price charged in any market:
Under APP, Medicaid claims a fraction 2 [0; 1] of the quantity weighted average market price. 8 See e.g., Congressional Budget O¢ ce report [4] and Scott Morton ( [29] , [30] ). 9 While we think this is the most appropriate model for the Medicaid application, in a later section, we also consider a general version of the minimum price provision rule where MFCs' demand is a¤ected by the post-rebate price (i.e., the price ultimately paid). The latter model may be more relevant for other applications including those discussed in Section 6.1.2. 7 So,
We will assume throughout our analysis that all n markets are served whether or not the MFC provisions are imposed. To this end we impose the following:
The demand functions q i are positive for every market i at the monopolist's optimal market prices for the problem without an MFC provision, the problem with MPP and the problem with APP.
We also assume that demand in each market is such that pro…t in that market (assuming no MFC clause) is a strictly concave function of price in that market whenever demand is positive. This assumption ensures that the unique solution of the monopolist's pro…t maximization problem without an MFC provision may be found by solving the …rst-order conditions. Formally, the following is assumed for the remainder of the paper:
Additional assumptions will be needed to support the …rst-order approach under MPP and APP. We defer discussion of those to the sections on MPP and APP respectively.
In addition to the pricing implications of the MFC clauses, we are interested in the social welfare e¤ects. To measure these, we use the classical Marshallian welfare criterion, consumers'surplus plus producers'surplus. 11 Since we allow for the possibility that MFC consumers'demand may have an inelastic component, z i , consumer surplus for these consumers would technically be in…nite, rendering Marshallian welfare insensitive to changes in market prices. This can easily be remedied by assuming demand is zero when market prices become high enough. More speci…cally, assume there is a nonbinding …nite upper bound on market prices, M , such that demand in all markets is zero at prices above M . This is equivalent to saying that the inelastic component of demand isn't really perfectly inelastic, but rather is inelastic until price hits M , and zero thereafter. For any price vector P = (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) and associated demand x (P ) = (x 1 (p 1 ) ; : : : ; x n (p n )), the Marshallian welfare measure, W (P ), will thus be given by
As we will be interested in the changes in welfare brought about by the various MFC clauses and not absolute welfare levels, our results will not depend in any way on the precise magnitude of the bound M . We do not explicitly consider at least two characteristics of the actual Medicaid rebate policy. First, participation in the Medicaid rebate program on the part of drug manufacturers is voluntary in the following sense: a manufacturer could choose not to enroll drugs in the rebate program in exchange for giving up coverage for them under Medicaid, e¤ectively eliminating sales to Medicaidcovered consumers. This could be modeled by including a participation constraint (i.e., that pro…ts under the rebate program should be at least as high as pro…ts without rebates when no Medicaid consumers are served). In practice, it appears that this constraint is not binding. Nearly all branded 1 1 See Schmalensee [27] and Varian [36] for discussions on the legitimacy of this measure. 8 and generic drug manufacturers enrolled when the rebate program was introduced (Scott Morton [29] ). Furthermore, in our model, it can be shown that this participation constraint is trivially satis…ed when Medicaid demand is almost as elastic as non-Medicaid demand (i.e., is close to 0). For higher values of , the constraint can be shown to be satis…ed under a restriction on the range of relative values of the inelastic component of Medicaid demand as it varies across markets (i.e., the range of ratios of the z i 's).
Second, the actual Medicaid rebate (at least for branded drugs) is calculated as the rebate from APP, or the rebate from MPP, whichever is higher. We analyze the two rebate forms separately. It is clear that these separate analyses can still give much insight into the combined problem. If at the optimal solution to the combined problem, only one of the two clauses, but not both, is binding, the solution will be exactly either the solution to the MPP problem or the solution to the APP problem and our analysis may be directly applied. If at the optimal solution, however, both clauses are simultaneously binding, then the solution to the combined problem may di¤er from the optimal solutions obtained through our separate analyses. Ideally we would have liked to analyze this case as well, however it appears to us to be quite intractable. Furthermore, we have been unable to locate evidence that would suggest the dual-binding case occurs in practice.
The Benchmark Case: No MFC Provision
As a point of comparison, it is useful to begin our analysis by looking at the pro…t maximization problem for the monopolist when there is no MFC clause. Without one, the monopolist receives revenue p i for each unit sold in market i, irrespective of the split between MFCs and non-MFCs within the market. The monopolist therefore chooses prices to maximize pro…ts no rebate as de…ned in (2.2). We call this the unconstrained problem. Let p m i denote the optimal monopoly price in market i. Given our assumptions, p m i is the unique solution to the equation
With no MFC clause, the social welfare is therefore given as
As it is convenient, without loss of generality, we henceforth assume p will also be helpful to denote the uniform monopoly price (i.e., the pro…t maximizing price under the constraint that the same price must be charged in each market) by p u , the unique solution to
1 2 If this is strictly violated, simply reindex the markets so that their numbering agrees with the monopoly price induced order. In cases where there is equality in monopoly prices across markets, a similar analysis can be carried out by …rst combining these markets into one. To see this, let us consider a situation where p m 1 < ::: < p m k = p m k+1 < ::: < p m n . If we de…ne a market indexed by k 0 by combining market k and market k + 1 such that q k 0 = q k + q k+1 and z k 0 = z k + z k+1 , then p m k 0 remains the same as p m k and p m k+1 . This returns us to a situation where strict inequality is maintainted among the optimal individual monopoly prices in each of these markets. 9 
Minimum Price Provision
We now examine the MPP problem. Under MPP, combining (2.3) and (2.4), the monopolist chooses market prices to maximize
Let b p i denote the market price charged in market i in the solution to this problem. For simplicity and tractability of our results, we consider the two market case (n = 2). We also assume the following strengthening of Assumption 2:
Just as Assumption 2 ensured that …rst-order conditions determined the unique solution to the monopolist's unconstrained problem, Assumption 3 does the same for the MPP problem. To see that this strengthens Assumption 2, notice that when p 1 = p 2 , (4.1) reduces to
, and thus Assumption 3 implies the strict concavity of (p i c)q i (p i ).
Our next result shows that the optimal price in market 1 will remain (weakly) below the optimal price in market 2 after MPP is imposed. The key to this is showing that the monopolist would always prefer to charge a uniform price compared to a situation of charging a high price in the …rst market and a low price in the second market.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then
With the aid of this lemma, we can describe the e¤ect of MPP on prices.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. If MPP is imposed, the minimum market price increases and the maximum market price decreases compared to the unconstrained case (i.e., b
. When some but not all of the consumers are MFCs ( 2 (0; 1)), these changes are strict. Further, the monopolist will charge a uniform price if and only if
2) In such a scenario, the optimal uniform price will be the uniform monopoly price, p u .
The …rst part of the above proposition shows that MPP raises the minimum market price but lowers the maximum market price. The basic intuition for this is that, under MPP, the monopolist pays a rebate based on the di¤erence between the minimum market price and the quantity weighted average market price. The monopolist therefore, all else equal, prefers to set prices so that the minimum market price is close to the quantity weighted average market price. This force pushes the minimum market price up and the maximum market price down. At an extreme, the two prices coincide and the monopolist prefers to charge a uniform price. When this happens, the rebate equals zero. Therefore, the only equal market price that can be optimal for the monopolist to charge is the uniform monopoly price, p u . The second part of the above proposition provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which the monopolist prefers to charge a uniform price. The condition has a simple interpretation -it says that, starting from uniform monopoly prices (p u ; p u ), a marginal increase in p 2 reduces the monopolist's pro…t (net of rebate) from sales in market 2. Alternatively, one could write a similar condition examining a marginal decrease in p 1 . Part of the proof of the proposition shows that it is enough to look at the change in only one of the markets. When (4.2) fails, market prices may be found by replacing p min with p 1 in (4.1) and setting the partial derivatives with respect to p 1 and p 2 equal to zero. This ensures that b p 1 and b p 2 exactly balance the marginal gain in pro…t due to reduction in rebate with the marginal loss in pro…t because of deviation from the unconstrained monopoly prices.
Welfare analysis of MPP
In considering the welfare e¤ects of MPP, it is important to note that any rebates collected are pure transfers from the monopolist to Medicaid. Therefore, the rebate amount does not enter into the measure of welfare directly. Any welfare e¤ect of such a policy will operate only through the change in market prices due to the introduction of MPP. 13 We start by describing a general result from Varian [36] about change in welfare. We apply the result in our setting to derive bounds on the change in welfare resulting from the imposition of MPP.
Consider an m -good economy for any …nite m > 0. Fact 1 (Varian [36] ) The change in welfare, 4W , satis…es the following bounds:
Proof. See the proof of Fact 2 in Varian [36] . The next result uses Fact 1 and the solutions to the monopoly pricing problems with and without MPP to obtain bounds on the change in welfare resulting from a MPP policy.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. The change in welfare, when moving from the unconstrained problem to a MPP policy, satis…es the following lower bound:
where 4Q denotes the corresponding change in aggregate demand. Furthermore, if q i (p) is concave in p 0 for i = 1; 2, then the change in welfare satis…es the following upper bound:
If, as is sometimes assumed in the optimal regulation and public …nance literatures, there is a social cost of transfers through the government, due to, for example, ine¢ cient taxation, the rebates could have a direct welfare e¤ect as well. 1 4 In our formulation of social welfare, we consider a …nite upper bound in prices, given by M , such that demand becomes zero at prices above M . In Varian ([36] ), there is no …nite upper bound in prices (M = 1) as he did not explicitly consider demand with an inelastic portion. However, it can be shown easily that all the results on welfare bounds in Varian ([36] ) go through with …nite M .
where 4 denotes the corresponding change in the monopolist's pro…t (excluding the rebate from the pro…t calculation).
The bounds in Proposition 2 use knowledge of only the realized change in aggregate demand, 4Q, the minimum price, b p 1 , the manufacturing cost, c, and the loss in pro…ts to the monopolist due to the MPP rule, 4 , to bound the change in welfare. As the monopolist can always do best when pricing is unrestricted, 4 is never positive under MPP. Moreover, (1 )
generates a decrease in welfare.
Average Price Provision
We now analyze the APP problem. We allow for n markets here as, for APP, this additional generality comes at no cost and may be helpful in applications. Under APP, the monopolist chooses prices to maximize
Let b p i denote the optimal market price in market i after APP in imposed. Then b p = (b p 1 ; b p 2 ; : : : ; b p n ) solves the …rst-order conditions: This says that optimal market prices under APP equate the marginal gain in pro…t due to reduction in total rebate paid with the marginal loss in pro…t due to deviation from the unconstrained monopoly prices. As in our analysis of MPP, we strengthen Assumption 2 to ensure that the …rst-order conditions determine a unique global optimum. To this end, assume the following:
Assumption 4 (5.1) is globally concave in (p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n ) whenever (q 1 (p 1 ) ; : : : ; q n (p n )) 0.
How do the market prices under APP compare to those in the unconstrained problem? Observe that at the solution of the unconstrained problem, (p 
Therefore, the sign of this expression is the key to understanding whether imposing APP will raise or lower market prices. The …rm's only motive for moving prices away from the unconstrained monopoly level is to reduce the rebates it has to pay. If, at unconstrained market prices, raising prices increases the total rebate under the APP rule, (5.3) is negative, implying that APP will result in lower market prices. Similarly, if raising prices decreases the total rebate, (5.3) is positive, implying that APP will result in higher market prices. In general, either case is possible. However, the inelasticity parameter, , is very helpful in determining which case is relevant. We show that when the inelasticity parameter takes extreme values one can unambiguously compare the APP market prices, b p, to the unconstrained prices. When the price responsiveness of Medicaid covered consumers is similar to that of other consumers (i.e., low enough), APP will increase market prices. If, instead, Medicaid covered consumers are much less price responsive (i.e., high enough), APP will decrease market prices. The following proposition formalizes this claim:
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. There exist and , 0 < < 1, such that (i) for < , all market prices strictly increase under APP compared to the unconstrained case, and (ii) for > , all market prices strictly decrease under APP compared to the unconstrained case.
What is the intuition for the role of in determining these e¤ects? Under APP, the total rebate paid is a fraction of the quantity weighted average market price times the total MFC demand for the product. The monopolist, all else equal, prefers to reduce the rebate it pays. Starting at the solution of the unconstrained problem, an increase in market prices generates two e¤ects on the total rebate. First, the quantity weighted average price increases. Second, total MFC demand for the product falls. When takes values close to zero, i.e., when MFCs'demand is almost as elastic as non-MFCs' demand for the product, the demand reduction e¤ect dominates and so by increasing prices from the unconstrained monopoly level, the …rm can reduce the rebate it pays. On the other hand, when takes values close to one, i.e., when MFC demand is almost inelastic, there is little demand reduction and the e¤ect on quantity weighted average price dominates, leading the monopolist to reduce the rebate by decreasing prices. Note that the boundaries of these regions, and , will vary with the fraction of MFCs, , the …rm's cost, c, and the demand functions q i . The determination of these boundaries is described in the proof. For intermediate values of , prices in di¤erent markets may move in di¤erent directions as a result of APP.
Welfare Analysis of APP
The change in social welfare engendered by APP depends on how it causes market prices to move. From Proposition 3, we know that for < , all market prices increase, and move further away from the competitive price (which is p i = c for all i). As a result, aggregate quantity falls and social welfare decreases. Conversely, for > , all market prices decrease and move toward the competitive price. As a result, aggregate quantity rises and social welfare increases. This argument proves the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. For < , social welfare decreases when APP is imposed and (ii) for > , social welfare increases when APP is imposed.
Thus, under APP, at least in the cases where all market prices move in the same direction, whether the policy is welfare improving is easy to detect by looking to see if market prices fall. 13 
Extensions and Applications

Rebate-responsive Minimum Price Provision
In our analysis, we have assumed that demand from Medicaid consumers (to the extent that it is price-sensitive) is based on pre-rebate market prices. This appears reasonable in the Medicaid context, not least because the rebates are essentially invisible to consumers. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, clauses similar to MPP appear in other contexts as well. Often, the analogue to rebates in these applications are more immediate and visible than under Medicaid. Thus, to expand the scope of application, and also as a robustness check on our Medicaid analysis, this section presents and analyzes a variation of MPP where MFC demand responds to post-rebate prices.
Under rebate-responsive MPP (RMPP), MFCs in market i receive a rebate r, which is the di¤erence between the market price, p i , and the minimum price, p min . The post-rebate price for MFCs in market i, is therefore given by
Unlike what we assumed earlier, MFCs demand depends on the post-rebate price, p i r. With RMPP, the monopolist therefore chooses market prices, p i , to maximize
We de…ne e p i as the optimal monopoly price if facing only the non-MFCs in market i. Without loss of generality and because it will prove convenient, we order the markets so that e p 1 < e p 2 < : : : < e p n : Note that this ordering of the markets is on the basis of the optimal monopoly prices when facing the non-MFC consumers only, and that this is di¤erent from the way we ordered markets in the previous sections. Here, e p i solves (p c)q
The following condition is useful in characterizing the optimal solution under RMPP:
[(e p n c)q
If the same price is being charged in all markets, the left-hand side of Condition U is the derivative of the pro…t function with respect to price evaluated at a price of e p n . Therefore, given strict concavity, Condition U is necessary and su¢ cient for the optimal uniform price to be above e p n . Note that, by de…nition, [(e p n c)q 0 n (e p n ) + q n (e p n )] is zero, whereas, by concavity, [(e p n c)q 0 i (e p n ) + q i (e p n )] is negative for any other i. The next result describes the optimal solution under RMPP and shows that Condition U determines whether this solution involves uniform pricing. Several comments are in order. First, note that Assumption 2 is enough to guarantee strict concavity of the pro…t function in the minimum market price and the validity of the …rst-order approach, unlike in our earlier MPP analysis. The reason for this is that, since the minimum price (post-rebate price) rather than the market price a¤ects MFC demand, the expressions involving prices in the objective function (6.2) are either linear in price (the inelastic part) or in the form of a standard pro…t function addressed by Assumption 2. Second, under RMPP, the minimum price may be charged in more than one market, even though distinct prices would be charged in each market in the absence of RMPP. 15 Third, n markets with RMPP turns out to be no more messy or di¢ cult than the two market case, which was less true of MPP and led to our choice to present the two market case in that analysis. Finally, as was true for MPP, market prices may decrease in some of the markets under RMPP compared to the unconstrained case. In those markets where the minimum price is not charged under RMPP, the monopolist will optimally charge the monopoly price as if demand in that market came only from non-MFCs. In those markets, before MPP is imposed, the optimal market price was higher (with equality if = 0) than the optimal monopoly price based on only the non-MFC section (this is because of the fact that if demand in a market is composed of both elastic and inelastic demands, then the optimal monopoly price for the combined market is higher than the optimal monopoly price for the elastic demand section only). Therefore, these prices decrease under MPP. However, as with MPP, we will now show that prices cannot fall in all markets under RMPP. In particular, the minimum market price charged under RMPP will always be higher than the minimum market price under unconstrained price discrimination. Formally:
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The minimum market price increases under RMPP, compared to the unconstrained case. In those markets where the minimum price is not charged, market prices decrease under RMPP, compared to the unconstrained case.
Welfare Analysis
As before, we apply Fact 1 to derive bounds on the change in welfare resulting from the imposition of RMPP. The following proposition uses Fact 1 and the solutions to the monopoly pricing problems in the inelastic demand framework with and without RMPP to obtain bounds on the change in welfare.
Proposition 7 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The change in welfare, when moving from no RMPP to an RMPP policy, satis…es the following lower bound:
where 4Q denotes the corresponding change in aggregate demand. Furthermore, if q i (p) is concave in p 0 for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, then the change in welfare satis…es the following upper bound:
where The lower bound in Proposition 7 use knowledge of only the realized change in aggregate demand, the minimum price and the cost to bound the change in welfare. As was true with MPP, it is important to note that even if cost, for example, is unobserved, the lower bound implies that welfare always increases when imposing RMPP results in an increase in aggregate demand.
Applications
Here we sketch a few applications of RMPP. a) Many European countries have adopted an external reference (ER) pricing scheme in regulating pharmaceutical prices. Under ER, the regulating country sets up a price cap based on prices in a selected group of countries. For example, the Netherlands and Switzerland introduced ER to regulate pharmaceutical prices in 1996. In the Netherlands, for a drug to be included in the list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals by the national health insurance, its price should not exceed the average price of the drug in Germany, France, UK and Belgium. Similarly, Switzerland averages the prices charged in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and UK. As of 2007, most of the European countries (excluding Denmark, Germany, Sweden and UK) have incorporated some forms of ER in their drug pricing regulations, but there is large variation in the design of the rules. First, the choice of reference countries di¤er. Second, some countries (for example, the Netherlands) uses the average of prices charged in the reference countries, while others (for example, Greece) use the minimum of the prices charged in the reference countries as a reference price. 16 These rules were primarily introduced to import the low prices from the reference markets to the regulated market. However, the e¤ectiveness of these rules in achieving this objective is signi…cantly constrained by the drug manufacturers'response through changing the price distribution across markets. Our RMPP framework is related to applications of ER. In RMPP, the MFC price is capped by the minimum price among prices charged in n markets. Like ER, RMPP creates a cross market e¤ect among the individual market prices. As we …nd with RMPP, prices in some of the reference markets may increase. Similar predictions are documented by Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac and Olivella [16] , who study the e¤ect of ER in the European drug pricing context. Understanding the e¤ects of these regulations is important for both the evaluation of the current policy as well as for providing normative suggestions for future regulation. Unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies determining the e¤ect of ER in isolation. An important exception is Heuer, Mejer and Neuhaus [12] who …nd empirical evidence that drug manufacturers strategically respond to ER by delaying the launch of new drugs in low-price countries.
b) Long term trading contracts with price protection: This type of contract is often present in markets where market power is on the side of the buyer. Applications include natural gas contracts (see e.g. Crocker and Lyon [9] ) and other utility contracts. Sellers often sign contractual agreements with large buyers (or buyers with large sellers) to provide the buyers (or sellers) with price protection over an extended time period . We can accommodate this problem in our set up in the following way. Consider this as an n period problem, where demand may change from period to period. A section of buyers, treated as most favored customers, will be paying the minimum price that prevails over the n periods. However, the seller is allowed to charge di¤erent prices in di¤erent periods to other customers. As long as it is not possible to substitute demand in one period for demand in another, we can treat these n di¤erent periods as n di¤erent markets with distinct demand curves. If the section of most favored customers remains a …xed fraction of the total consumers in every market, this formulation will directly …t our model. c) Exogenous shift of consumers between markets: Consider the example of an electronics goods manufacturer who sells her product in di¤erent locations through retailers. Retailers di¤er in their bargaining power, depending on the size and elasticity of their individual markets. Assuming a high level of search cost, this would typically result in high dispersion in retail prices. Now consider an exogenous mechanism that can reduce the search cost for a section of consumers. For example, with the growth of web based transactions, almost every retailer now maintains a web site that allows online purchase of electronics goods. Not everybody can easily access or feels comfortable using that market, but for those who do, search cost is reduced to a large extent. Assuming that the fraction of consumers who may exercise the online purchasing option remains relatively constant across di¤erent markets, this implies that a section of consumers from every market now pay the minimum price (ignoring di¤erences in retailer service provision and return policies).
What is important from a theoretical perspective is that the external referencing to calculate a price cap or the long term trading contractual agreements or exogenous shifts in location of consumers create a cross-market e¤ect among the individual market prices in the monopolist's objective function. In each market, a fraction of the consumers is now paying a price that is connected to the prices charged in other markets. The RMPP model precisely deals with the situation where this crossmarket connection is induced through minimum price protection.
Summary
Our analyses in sections 4 and 5 show how the MPP and APP rebate rules a¤ect a monopolist's optimal pricing strategy as well as social welfare under third-degree price discrimination. In the context of MPP, we present our analysis with two markets. The minimum market price charged always rises compared to the no regulation case. In contrast, prices in markets where the minimum is not charged will fall. The welfare e¤ect of MPP may be good or bad. A useful su¢ cient condition for MPP to be welfare improving is that MPP raise aggregate quantity. We also analyze a rebate-responsive version, RMPP, where MFCs demand are a¤ected by the post-rebate (i.e., minimum) price. We …nd that RMPP has e¤ects on prices and social welfare similar to MPP and suggest a number of applications beyond the Medicaid context.
Under APP, we …nd that all market prices move in the same direction in two di¤erent scenarios: when MFCs demand is su¢ ciently inelastic or when MFCs' demand is su¢ ciently similar to nonMFCs demand. When MFCs' demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, all market prices decrease, resulting in an increase in aggregate quantity and social welfare. In contrast, when MFCs' demand is close to non-MFCs'demand, all market prices increase, resulting in a decrease in aggregate quantity and social welfare.
The analysis of these policies is surprisingly intricate, even in a relatively simple setting such as ours. This suggests that great care is needed when implementing such MFC rules and that making provisions for data collection to support follow-up empirical work measuring the pricing and demand response has high potential value in avoiding mistakes or helping …ne-tune the policy. Some theoretical issues that we have not addressed here, such as incorporating demand uncertainty, second-degree price discrimination and the e¤ect on dynamic R&D incentives for the manufacturer are interesting topics for future work to explore. lowest possible e¤ective rebate. Therefore, the solution of (4.1) is also the solution of the maximization problem when the monopolist maximizes pro…ts (the …rst sum in equation 4.1), under the constraint of uniform pricing. A remaining question is thus, when is the uniform monopoly price optimal? When it is not, we know that b p 1 < b p 2 . We claim that it is su¢ cient to prove optimality of the uniform monopoly price (under Assumption 2) by checking whether starting from the uniform monopoly price it does not give a local improvement to either lower p 1 or raise p 2 . When will these moves not give a local improvement? When the partial derivative of (4.1) with respect to p 1 when taken from below and evaluated at uniform monopoly prices is positive and the partial derivative of (4.1) with respect to p 2 when taken from above and evaluated at uniform monopoly prices is negative. Formally, these one-sided partial derivatives are, from below and above respectively:
where dp q (p; p 2 ) dp
2) dp q (p 1 ; p) dp
where dp q (p 1 ; p) dp
When calculated at (p 1 = p u ; p 2 = p u ), (8.1) and (8.2) simplify to:
respectively. Recall that the uniform monopoly price is de…ned by the condition
Using this to substitute into (8.3) gives:
which is positive (so there is no gain from lowering p 1 ) exactly when
The other partial (8.4) is negative (so there is no gain from raising p 2 ) exactly at the same condition. Thus, whenever (4.2) holds true, the uniform monopoly price is optimal, and otherwise the optimum will have b Proof of Proposition 2. To apply Fact 1, take
From the right-hand-side inequality of Fact 1, we see that
Notice that the change in aggregate demand, 4Q, is given by
The inequality in (8.5) therefore gives us
Next, assume that q i (p) is concave in p 0 for i = 1; 2. We, therefore, have
Therefore, we have
From the left-hand-side inequality of Fact 1, we see that
Combining the above inequality with the inequality in (8.7), we get
The change in the monopolist's pro…t (including rebate) can be written as
After adding and subtracting 4 to the right-hand side expression in (8.8) and rearranging terms, we get
Proof of Proposition 3. We …rst calculate the derivative of the quantity weighted average price with respect to individual prices. De…ne m i
The …rst-order conditions of the APP-constrained problem are given by 
Note that when computed at (p .1) ). Also, as
, we can simplify (8.12) , when computed at (p 
Therefore, the …rst-order derivative of the APP-constrained problem, when computed at (p m 1 ; : : : ; p m n ), can be written (by (8.11)) as
0 always. Therefore, sign of (8.14) will be determined by relative values of the two terms,
In general, the …rst-order conditions can take either sign. In order to prove the proposition, we calculate the partial derivatives at two extreme values of . At = 0, when MFC demand is as elastic as non-MFCs, the term in (8.14) can be written as
which is always positive, as q 0 i (p i ) < 0 for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. On the other hand, at = 1, when MFC demand is completely inelastic, the term in (8.14) can be written as
which is always negative for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Since (8.14) evaluated at p i = p and show that its optimal solution coincides with the optimal solution of the original problem (6.1).
We then derive properties of the optimal minimum market price by studying the …rst order condition of this modi…ed problem. Given Proposition 5, the maximization problem (6.1) may be rewritten as the following problem of maximizing with respect to k and p min , where only an upper bound on p min is imposed: max p<e p k+1 ;k2f1;2;:::;ng
(e p i c)q i (e p i ) (8.15)
where e p n+1 de…ned as 1.
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Let b p and b k solve (8:15) . We now show that the unique solution to the following unconstrained optimization problem is p = b p: (1 )
The above condition characterizes the minimum market price under RMPP. Let j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the market in which the unconstrained monopoly price was lowest. Denoting that monopoly price by p m j , it is the unique solution of 
By Assumption 2, S (p) is decreasing in p. Furthermore, for every i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n, (1 ) [(p m j 1 7 In this scenario, prices in all markets could even be greater than e pn. To accommodate such a possibility, we set the upper limit as in…nity (by setting e p n+1 = 1). Proof of Proposition 7. To make it easier to apply Fact 1, we make the following adjustment in our notation: when writing the price vector we will treat the MFC and non-MFC sections of each market as two di¤erent markets. The generic price vector is thus P = (p 1 ; : : : ; p 2n ) 2 R 2n + where p i and p n+i denote the prices faced by the non-MFC and the MFC sections of market i respectively. Without MPP, the monopolist's optimal price vector is given by (p that the corresponding market demands will be x (P) = ((1 ) q 1 (p 1 ) ; : : : (1 ) q n (p n ) ; f(1 ) q 1 (p n+1 ) + z 1 g ; : : : ; f(1 ) q n (p 2n ) + z n g) .
Let us …rst consider the case when Condition U is violated. Applying Fact 1 yields
The change in aggregate demand, 4Q, is given by
The right-hand side inequality in (8.19) gives us
4W
(1 ) Applying Fact 1 yields Notice that the change in the monopolist's pro…t can be written as Further, if Condition U holds, the change in pro…t is given by
After adding and subtracting 4 to the right-hand side expression in (8.29) and rearranging terms, we get 4W (b p c) 4Q 4 .
